Diametros https://diametros.uj.edu.pl/diametros <p>Founded in 2004, <em>Diametros</em> (ISSN 1733-5566) is a scholarly, peer-reviewed journal that publishes original research and review articles in both English and Polish. It welcomes submissions from all areas of philosophy, as well as those at the intersections between philosophy and other disciplines. An open-access journal, indexed by all of the most important databases (<a href="https://www.scopus.com/sourceid/21100201733" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Scopus</a>, <a href="https://mjl.clarivate.com/search-results?issn=1733-5566&amp;hide_exact_match_fl=true&amp;utm_source=mjl&amp;utm_medium=share-by-link&amp;utm_campaign=journal-profile-share-this-journal" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Web of Science</a>), <em>Diametros</em> is free for readers &amp; authors. Włodzimierz Galewicz (Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University in Kraków, Poland) is the founder of the journal and the editor-in-chief. <a href="https://www.diametros.iphils.uj.edu.pl/diametros/about">About the journal.</a></p> Instytut Filozofii UJ en-US Diametros 1733-5566 <p style="margin-bottom: 0.35cm;">By submitting his/her work to the Editorial Board, the author accepts, upon having his/her text recommended for publication, that&nbsp;<em>Diametros</em> applies the Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) license to works we publish. Under this license, authors agree to make articles legally available for reuse, without permission or fees, for any purpose except commercial. Anyone may read, download, copy, print, distribute or reuse these articles without asking prior permission from the publisher or the author, as long as the author and original source are properly cited. The author holds the copyright without any other restrictions. Full information about CC-BY-NC: &nbsp;<a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/legalcode" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/legalcode</a>.</p> <p style="margin-bottom: 0.35cm;"><a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"><img src="http://mirrors.creativecommons.org/presskit/buttons/80x15/svg/by-nc.svg" alt="Creative Commons License"></a></p> Setting Health-Care Priorities. What Ethical Theories Tell Us. A Response to My Critics https://diametros.uj.edu.pl/diametros/article/view/1756 <p>The article provides answers to comments in this journal on my recent book, <em>Setting Health-Care Priorities. What Ethical Theories Tell Us</em> (Oxford University Press, 2019). Did I address all of the relevant theories? Yes, I did. Was my argument underdeveloped in any respects? Yes, at least in one as I should perhaps have discussed contractual ethical thinking more carefully. I do so in this response. Moreover, the critical comments raised have helped me to clarify my argument in many ways, for which I thank my critics.</p> Torbjörn Tännsjö Copyright (c) 2021 Torbjörn Tännsjö https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 2021-06-30 2021-06-30 18 68 60 70 10.33392/diam.1756 The Symposium on “Setting Health-Care Priorities” by Torbjörn Tännsjö https://diametros.uj.edu.pl/diametros/article/view/1757 <p>The present paper constitutes an introduction to a special issue of <em>Diametros</em> devoted to <em>Setting Health-Care Priorities.</em><em> What Ethical Theories Tell Us</em> by Torbjörn Tännsjö. The book in question states that there are three moral theories which have valid implications in the field of the distribution of medical resources in a healthcare system: utilitarianism (possibly conjoined with prioritarianism), the maximin/leximin view, and egalitarianism. A number of authors have contributed to this special issue with papers which challenge this thesis. Robert E. Goodin argues that, besides general moral theories, some local principles of justice might be valid. Quinn Hiroshi Gibson states that Tännsjö should have considered the Rawlsian view on justice in its contractualist reading. Jay A. Zameska argues that his “revised lexical sufficientarianism” constitutes a more reliable moral view than prioritarianism. Finally, Lasse Nielsen points out that there is more to say about distributive justice than consequentialist theories can grasp. Moreover, he puts forward an argument in defense of prioritarianism. The final article in this issue constitutes Tännsjö’s replies to his critics.</p> Piotr Grzegorz Nowak Copyright (c) 2021 Piotr Grzegorz Nowak https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 2021-06-30 2021-06-30 18 68 1 8 10.33392/diam.1757 Rawlsian Contractualism and Healthcare Allocation: A response to Torbjörn Tännsjö https://diametros.uj.edu.pl/diametros/article/view/1682 <p>The consideration of the problem of healthcare allocation as a special case of distributive justice is especially alluring when we only consider consequentialist theories. I articulate here an alternative Rawlsian non-consequentialist theory which prioritizes the fairness of healthcare allocation procedures rather than directly setting distributive parameters. The theory in question stems from Rawlsian commitments that, it is argued, have a better Rawlsian pedigree than those considered as such by Tännsjö. The alternative framework is worthy of consideration on its own merits, but it also casts light on two related difficulties with Tännsjö’s approach: (i) the limits of his supposedly ecumenical methodology, which is revealed to be dialectically suspect and (ii) issues with the type of abstraction and idealization from actual judgements and preferences which the approach requires.</p> Quinn Hiroshi Gibson Copyright (c) 2021 Quinn Hiroshi Gibson https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 2021-05-22 2021-05-22 18 68 9 23 10.33392/diam.1682 Setting Health-Care Priorities: A Reply to Tännsjö https://diametros.uj.edu.pl/diametros/article/view/1597 <p>This paper firstly distinguishes between principles of “global justice” that apply the same anywhere and everywhere – Tännsjö’s utilitarianism, egalitarianism, prioritarianism and such like – and principles of “local justice” that apply within the specific sphere of health-care. Sometimes the latter might just be a special case of the former – but not always. Secondly, it discusses reasons, many psychological in nature, why physicians might devote excessive resources to prolonging life pointlessly, showing once again that those reasons might themselves be morally significant.</p> Robert E. Goodin Copyright (c) 2020 Bob Goodin https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 2020-08-01 2020-08-01 18 68 24 32 10.33392/diam.1597 Defending Deontic Constraints and Prioritarianism: Two Remarks on Tännsjö’s Setting Health-Care Priorities https://diametros.uj.edu.pl/diametros/article/view/1673 <p>Torbjörn Tännsjö has written a clear and thought-provoking book on healthcare priority setting. He argues that different branches of ethical theory—utilitarianism, egalitarianism, and prioritarianism—are in general agreement on real-world healthcare priorities, and that it is human irrationality that stands in the way of complying with their recommendations. While I am generally sympathetic to the overall project and line of argumentation taken by the book, this paper raises two concerns with Tännsjö’s argument. First, that he is wrong to set aside deontic constraints as irrelevant or as pointing in the same direction as consequentialism. Secondly, that his argument against prioritarianism in favor of utilitarianism is insufficient and under-developed. Given these problems, I conclude that we should welcome Tännsjö’s contribution but with these qualifications in mind.</p> Lasse Nielsen Copyright (c) 2021 Lasse Nielsen https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 2021-06-22 2021-06-22 18 68 33 45 10.33392/diam.1673 The Sufficientarian Alternative: A Commentary on Setting Health-Care Priorities https://diametros.uj.edu.pl/diametros/article/view/1605 <p>In this commentary on Torbjörn Tännsjö’s&nbsp;<em>Setting Health-Care Priorities</em>, I argue that sufficientarianism provides a valuable perspective in considering how to set health care priorities. I claim that&nbsp;<em>pace</em>&nbsp;Tännsjö, sufficientarianism&nbsp;<em>does</em>&nbsp;offer a distinct alternative to prioritarianism. To demonstrate this, I introduce sufficientarianism and distinguish two forms: Tännsjö’s “weak sufficientarianism” and an alternative strong form of sufficientarianism that I call “revised lexical sufficientarianism.” I raise a problem for Tännsjö’s sufficientarianism, and advocate for the revised view on this basis. I then demonstrate that in the area of population ethics, the revised view outperforms the other views Tännsjö considers. As such, I aim to demonstrate that sufficientarianism — understood as its own theory and not just as a form of prioritarianism — offers unique advantages in population ethics, and would have been a valuable complement to the other theories Tännsjö considers.</p> Jay Zameska Copyright (c) 2021 Jay Zameska https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0 2020-01-15 2020-01-15 18 68 46 59 10.33392/diam.1605