Diametros 2021-04-27T08:01:12+02:00 Redakcja / Editorial Office Open Journal Systems <p>Founded in 2004, <em>Diametros</em> (ISSN 1733-5566) is a scholarly, peer-reviewed journal that publishes original research and review articles in both English and Polish. It welcomes submissions from all areas of philosophy, as well as those at the intersections between philosophy and other disciplines. An open-access journal, indexed by all of the most important databases (<a href="" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Scopus</a>, <a href=";hide_exact_match_fl=true&amp;utm_source=mjl&amp;utm_medium=share-by-link&amp;utm_campaign=journal-profile-share-this-journal" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Web of Science</a>), <em>Diametros</em> is free for readers &amp; authors. Włodzimierz Galewicz (Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University in Kraków, Poland) is the founder of the journal and the editor-in-chief. <a href="">About the journal.</a></p> Metalinguistic Negotiations and Two Senses of Taste 2021-04-27T08:01:12+02:00 David Bordonaba-Plou <p class="p1">This paper defends the claim that the traditional Kantian division between two different types of judgments, judgments of personal preference (subjectively valid) and judgments of taste (intersubjectively valid), does not apply to some contexts in which metalinguistic negotiations take place. To begin, I first highlight some significant similarities between predicates of personal taste and aesthetic predicates. I sustain that aesthetic predicates are gradable and multidimensional, and that they often produce metalinguistic negotiations, characteristics that have motivated an individual treatment for predicates of personal taste. Secondly, contrary to Kant’s claim, I maintain that there are cases where judgments of personal preference are intersubjectively valid; in some contexts of metalinguistic negotiation, judgments of personal preference direct universality to a similar extent as judgments of taste. Some examples of real-life conversations will be presented to illustrate this point.</p> 2021-01-05T00:00:00+01:00 Copyright (c) 2021 David Bordonaba-Plou Sartre and Merleau-Ponty’s Theories of Perception as Cognition in the Context of Phenomenological Thought in Cognitive Sciences 2021-03-28T17:16:30+02:00 Marta Agata Chojnacka <p>Husserl’s phenomenology was particularly influential for a number of French philosophers&nbsp;and their theories. Two of the most prominent French thinkers, Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, turned to the instruments offered by phenomenology in their attempts to understand&nbsp;the notions of the body, consciousness, imagination, human being, world and many others. Both&nbsp;philosophers also provided their definitions of perception, but they understood this notion in very&nbsp;different ways. The paper describes selected aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology that were adopted&nbsp;by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty and depicts the presumptions of their respective theories of perception,&nbsp;as well as the differences between them. The main thesis presented here is that theories as different&nbsp;as those proposed by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty may, and indeed do, lead to the same conclusion,&nbsp;i.e. that perception represents a different form of cognition. Despite the differences between these&nbsp;theories, they can both be placed in the contemporary context of phenomenological research carried&nbsp;out by cognitive philosophers Dan Zahavi and Shaun Gallagher, as well as by the proponent of the&nbsp;enactive theory of perception, Alva Noë.</p> 2020-06-13T00:00:00+02:00 Copyright (c) 2020 Marta Agata Chojnacka Helmuth Plessner's Social and Political Thought in Light of his Philosophy of Life 2021-03-28T17:16:30+02:00 Karol Chrobak <p class="p1">The essay contains an analysis of selected socio-political ideas of Helmuth Plessner. The basic assumption of this study is the existence of a close categorial relationship between Plessner’s reflections in <em>The Limits of Community</em><span class="Apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>(1924) and in <em>Die Stufen des Organischen</em> (1928). As the interpretative key, the author uses one of the pivotal concepts of Plessner’s philosophy of life, namely the category of “border.” Showing the adequacy of this category in relation to Plessner’s social and political concepts, the essay addresses the issue of the individual-society relationship, the question of social roles and their possible deviations, and the problem of political leadership.</p> 2020-05-31T00:00:00+02:00 Copyright (c) 2020 Karol Chrobak Senses of objectivity. Henri Poincaré and Ernst Cassirer in the context of structural realism 2021-03-28T17:16:30+02:00 Damian Luty <p>The goal of the paper is to, at least partly, justify the rejection of what I term the thesis of the origins of structural realism. This thesis deals with the connections, postulated by a certain metaphilosophical narrative, between the contemporary positions of epistemic/ontic structural realism and the views held by physicists and philosophers from the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. In the paper I summarize the above-mentioned positions and the relationships they are supposed to have enjoyed with the philosophy of Henri Poincaré and Ernst Cassirer. I then proceed to illustrate why such relationships are ill-founded and present conclusions about the unique nature of both structural realism and the notions of objectivity and reality in their context.</p> 2020-03-07T00:00:00+01:00 Copyright (c) 2020 Damian Luty Aristotle about the possibility to be unjust towards oneself 2021-03-28T17:16:30+02:00 Maciej Smolak <p>The aim of this article is to clarify the sense of Aristotle's <em>aporia </em>“whether it is possible to treat oneself unjustly or not” and to argue that it is possible to treat oneself unjustly voluntarily. Two passages in <em>NE</em> V 9 are particularly noteworthy, namely &nbsp;1136a31-1136b1 and 1136b13-25. In the first passage Aristotle proposes the hypothesis that the uncontrolled person (<em>acratic</em>) is capable to treat oneself unjustly voluntarily. In the second passage he gives two arguments – “from apparent loss” and “from wish” – which aim to prove that no one can treat oneself unjustly voluntarily. Both arguments do not invalidate hypothesis, nor exclude the possibility to be unjust towards oneself voluntarily.</p> 2020-11-01T00:00:00+01:00 Copyright (c) 2020 Maciej Smolak